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ABSTRACT
While most attorneys have heard of means-plus-function, most have not heard of or given
much thought to its sibling, step-plus-function. Both claims arise under the same section of
the patent laws, namely 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6. While means-plus-function limitations are
directed to structural limitations and most often appear in apparatus claims, stepplus
function limitations are directed to steps and most often appear in method claims. Meansplus-function limitations generally arise when the patentee chooses to recite a "means for"
performing a specified or recited function rather than reciting the structure or material that
performs that function. Step-plus-function limitations, on the other hand, potentially arise
when a claim drafter chooses to recite a "step for" performing a specified or recited function.
This article analyzes the limited but complex jurisprudence surrounding step -plus-function
limitations. Finally, the article provides tips for avoiding step-plus-function limitations and
proposes that recent decisions may allow courts to step away from Judge Rader's complicated
analysis, so courts may neither have to confront the "difficulty of distinguishing acts from
functions" nor engage in a "careful analysis of the limitation in the context of the overall claim
and the specification" in order to discern whether a step-plus-function limitation exists.
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STEP-PLUS-FUNCTION: JUST WHAT HAVE WE STEPPED INTO?
PAUL R. KITCH*

INTRODUCTION

Step-plus-function. While most patent attorneys have heard of it, they probably
have never really given it much thought. It is quite possible that they believe they
have never drafted or even encountered a step-plus-function limitation. Until
recently I had never encountered an allegation that a limitation of a method claim
actually was a step-plus-function limitation. So just what is a step-plus-function
limitation? Is this a new thing? What are the ramifications of a limitation being
found to be a step-plus-function limitation? What does the Federal Circuit have to
say about step-plus-function and how often has it found a limitation to be a step-plusfunction limitation? This paper will attempt to answer these questions.
In summary, the Federal Circuit case law in this area can be confusing. In his
concurring opinion in Seal-Flex, Ine. v. Athletic Track & Court Construction,1 Judge
Rader proposed procedures for determining whether a claimed step is a step-plusfunction limitation. 2
While generally helpful, his suggestion for determining
whether step-plus-function applies appears to unnecessarily complicate matters,
makes it difficult for patentees to cleanly avoid potential step-plus-function
invocation, and obscures the scope of claims in contravention of the desired public
notice function of claims.
After addressing these questions, this paper provides some suggestions for
drafting claims to reduce the chances that a limitation will be found to be a step-plusfunction limitation against the wishes of the patentee.
Finally, the paper concludes that some of the decisions of the Federal Circuit
may allow courts to avoid having to employ Judge Rader's proposed procedures and
thus avoid having to engage in the "careful analysis of [a] limitation in the context of
the overall claim and the specification"3 in an effort to distinguish "acts" from
"functions."

*Mr. Kitch is a partner in the Technology and Intellectual Property Group at Nixon Peabody
LLP. He counsels clients concerning a variety of aspects of intellectual property, including patent
portfolio generation and management, trademark matters, and general intellectual property
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Trademark Office. In addition to his law degree, Mr. Kitch received his M.B.A. (high distinction)
and Electrical Engineering (summa cum laude) degrees from the University of Michigan. Mr. Kitch
can be contacted at 312-425-3900 or at pkitch@nixonpeabody.com. Summer Associates Brad Taub
and Jason Kray contributed to research for this paper. The views expressed herein are those of the
author and are not necessarily those of Nixon Peabody LLP.
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1172 F.3d 836 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
2 Id. at 848.
Id. at 849.
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I. WHAT IS A STEP-PLUS-FUNCTION LIMITATION?

So what is a step-plus-function limitation? A step-plus-function limitation is the
sibling of the more commonly known means-plus-function limitation. They both arise
from the same section of the patent laws, namely, 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 ("§ 112, 6").
This section provides:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means
or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure,
material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to
cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the
4
specification and equivalents thereof.
While means-plus-function limitations are directed to structural limitations and
most often appear in apparatus claims, step-plus-function limitations are directed to
steps and most often appear in method claims. Means-plus-limitations typically
arise when the claim drafter chooses to recite a "means for" performing a specified or
recited function rather than reciting the structure or material that performs that
function. For example, a claim may recite "means for fastening two pieces of wood
together" instead of reciting a particular connecting means such as a nail, a screw, or
glue. Step-plus-function limitations, on the other hand, potentially arise when a
claim drafter chooses to recite a "step for" performing a specified or recited function.

II.

ARE STEP-PLUS-FUNCTION LIMITATIONS A NEW THING?

No. And yes.
Step-plus-function limitations are a creature of § 112,
6. This paragraph of
section 112 has been in existence since it was enacted in 1952, albeit, it was
paragraph 3 at that time. 5 Accordingly, the concept of step-plus-function is over fifty
years old.
On the other hand, the attempted invocation of § 112, 6 by accused infringers
to narrow the scope of method claims asserted in litigation is a fairly new trend. The
Federal Circuit did not rule on whether a limitation was a step-plus-function
limitation until 1997.6 Since that time, the Federal Circuit has substantively
addressed potential step-plus-limitations in only seven more cases plus once in a
concurring opinion. 7 However, the Federal Circuit has ruled on whether a limitation
4 35 U.S.C. § 112,

6 (2006).
5 See Caterpillar Inc. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (N.D. Ind. 1996) ("In
1952, Congress reacted to the Haiburton [Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S.
1 (1946)] decision by enacting paragraph six of § 112 (then paragraph 3) ... .

6Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
7 See 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1580-84 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Seal-Flex, Inc. v.
Athletic Track & Court Constr., 172 F.3d 836, 840-52 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (addressing the step-plusfunction limitations in the concurring opinion); Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. Med. Tech. Inc., 263
F.3d 1356, 1363-69 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 279 F.3d 1022,
1028-33 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1326-28 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
Utica Enters., Inc. v. Fed. Broach & Mach. Co., 109 F. App'x 403, 409-11 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Cardiac
Pacemakers, Inc. v. Saint Jude Med., Inc., 381 F.3d 1371, 1381-83 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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was a step-plus-function limitation in only six cases. 8 Accordingly, with respect to
the Federal Circuit, step-plus-function is still in its infancy.

III. WHAT ARE THE RAMIFICATIONS OF A LIMITATION BEING FOUND
To BE A STEP-PLUS-FUNCTION LIMITATION?

The Federal Circuit case law is clear on how § 112, 6 has to be parsed when
dealing with a potential means-plus-function limitation as opposed to a potential
step-plus-function limitation. 9 In this regard, it is clear that with respect to the
language of the statute "structure and material go with means, acts go with steps." 10
Accordingly, when dealing with a potential means -plus -function limitation, § 112, 6
can be read as:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
means ... for performing
structure [or] material ...

construed
material ...

to

cover

a specified function without the recital of
in support thereof, and such claims shall be

the

corresponding

structure

[and/or]

described in the specification and equivalents thereof. 1

Conversely, when dealing with a potential step-plus-function limitation, § 112,
6 can be read as:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a... step
for performing a specified function without the recital of ... acts in support
thereof, and such claim
shall be
construed
to cover
the
corresponding ...

acts, described

in

the

specification

and

equivalents

thereof. 12
Accordingly, when a limitation is found to be a step-plus-function limitation, the
literal scope of that limitation is narrowed from covering all acts for performing the
recited function to only those acts described in the specification for performing the
13
recited function and equivalents of those acts.

8 See Serrano, 111 F.3d at 1583; 01. Corp., 115 F.3d at 1583; GenerationII Orthoties Inc., 263
F.2d at 1369; Epeon Gas Sys., Inc., 279 F.3d at 1033; Masco Corp., 303 F.3d at 1328; Utica Enters.,

109 F. App'x at 411. It is noted that in 1998 the Federal Circuit did decline an interlocutory appeal
that was alleged to present novel step-plus-function issues. Microchip Tech., Inc., v. Scenix
Semiconductor, Inc., Nos. 558, 559, 1998 WL 743923, at **1-2 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 1998).
9 0.1. Coip, 115 F.3d at 1582-83.
10Id. at 1583.
11 35
12 Jd
13

U.S.C. § 112,

6 (2006).

Utica Enters., 109 F. App'x at 410.
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IV. How OFTEN HAS THE

FEDERAL CIRCUIT FOUND A LIMITATION
A STEP-PLUS-FUNCTION LIMITATION?

To BE

Never! Not even once!

V. WHAT DOES THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAVE To SAY ABOUT
STEP-PLUS-FUNCTIONS?

As explained above, the Federal Circuit has been confronted with alleged stepplus-limitations in nine cases. These cases and their treatment of step-plus-function
are reviewed chronologically in detail below.

A. Serrano v. Telular Corp.
The first case in which the Federal Circuit had to address step-plus-function
was Serrano v. Telular Corp.,14 which was decided on April 25, 1997. The panel
consisted of Judges Mayer, Clevenger, and Lourie and the opinion was written by
5
Judge Lourie. 1
The disputed method claim limitation was in claim 1 of U.S. Patent No.
4,775,997 ("'997 patent"). 16 A similar means-plus-function limitation in a system
claim in a related patent was also at issue. 17 Claim 1 of the '997 patent is reproduced
below with the disputed limitation emphasized along with a chart comparing the
disputed method and system claim limitations.
1. A method of interfacing a telephone communications-type device
which is capable of providing a touch-tone/rotary dial-type telephone signal
with a radio transceiver used in a telephone communication system wherein
the transceiver is capable of radio communication with a remote radio
transmitter-receiver system that is part of a telephone network, said
method comprising:
coupling a transceiver to a telephone communications-type device
which is capable of providing touch-tone/rotary dial-type telephone signals
in order to allow for at least one-way communication between the
transceiver and the telephone communications-type device;
said step of coupling comprising converting each dialed number of the
telephone communications-type device into digital data;

14 111 F.3d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
15 _d
16

at 1579.
1581.

d. at

17Id.at 1580.
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said step of coupling further comprising automatically determining at
least the last-dialed number of the telephone number dialed on the
telephone communications-type device; and
sending each digitally-converted number formed by said step of
18
converting to the transceiver for subsequent transmittal.

U.S. Patent No. 4,922,517

U.S. Patent No. 4,775,997

1. A system for interfacing a
telephone communications-type
device ... the system comprises:

1. A method of interfacing a
telephone communications-type
device ... , said method comprising:

determination means coupled with
the telephone number digital conversion
means for automaticaly determining the
last digit of the group of telephone digits
provided at the transceiver coupling
means .... 19

further comprising automatically
determining at least the last-daled
number of the telephone number dialed
on the telephone communications-type
device; .... 20

The entirety of the Federal Circuit's treatment of the step-plus-function issue is
as follows:
[The method claim] includes a determining step rather than a
determination means, but it is not drafted in "step plus function" form.
That is because it does not recite a function. See 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6
(1994). Rather, it recites only the act of determining a last-dialed digit.
Therefore, we must simply apply the claim language to the accused devices
free from the limiting requirements of section 112, 6.21
As can be seen, the court simply concluded the limitation was not in step-plusfunction form because it did not recite a function, but instead recited an act.22 From
this passage it is unclear whether the determining factor for concluding that § 112,
6 did not apply was that (1) the phrase "step for" was not used, (2) the limitation
did not set forth a function in addition to the recited step of "determining," (3) the
gerund "determining" was an act instead of a function, or (4) some combination of
these factors. As will be seen, however, succeeding Federal Circuit cases have
embraced the first factor and at least initial decisions embraced an analysis which
focused on determining whether a recited gerund constitutes a function or an act.
U.S. Patent No. 4,775,997 col. 15 (filed Apr. 8, 1987) (emphasis added).
19U.S. Patent No. 4,922,517 cols. 15-16 (filed Sept. 15, 1988) (emphasis added).
20 U.S. Patent No. 4,775,997 col. 15 (filed Apr. 8, 1987) (emphasis added).
21 Serrano, 111 F.3d at 1583.
18

22 Id.
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Also, while the Federal Circuit did not address the parallelism between the
language of the "means for" limitation and the method limitation, subsequent cases
including the very next case do.

B. 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co.
The next case to address step-plus-function, 0.L. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 23 was
decided on May 22, 1997, less than one month after the Serranodecision. The panel
consisted of Judges Rich, Mayer, and Lourie and the opinion was written again by
24
Judge Lourie.
The method claim at issue was claim 9 of U.S. Patent No. 5,358,557, which is
reproduced below with the disputed language emphasized:
9. A method for removing water vapor from an analyte slug passing
between a sparge vessel, trap and gas chromatograph, comprising the steps
of:
(a) passing the analyte slug through a passage heated to a first
temperature higher than ambient, as the analyte slug passes from the
sparge vessel to the trap; and
(b) passingthe analyte slug through the passage that is air cooled to a
second temperature below said first temperature but not below ambient, as
25
the analyte slug passes from the trap to the gas chromatograph.
The district court applied § 112,
6 to the disputed claim language because it
thought that claim 9 was "expressed strictly in terms of the steps for performing the
specified function of removing water vapor from an analyte slug." 26 The Federal
Circuit rejected this conclusion and found the "passing" limitations were "not drafted
27
in step-plus-function form and thus not subject to this provision."
The Federal Circuit engaged in a lengthy discussion of § 112, 6 and step-plusfunctions. First, the court construed the statute and found that "acts go with
steps." 28 Specifically, the court stated:
We interpret the term "steps" to refer to the generic description of elements
of a process, and the term "acts" to refer to the implementation of such
steps. This interpretation is consistent with the established correlation
between means and structure. In this paragraph, structure and material go

115 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
at 1578.
25 U.S. Patent No. 5,358,557 col. 10 (filed Dec. 9, 1996) (emphasis added).
26 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., No. G-95-113, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22839, at *9 (S.D. Tex. June
14, 1996), affd on other grounds, 115 F.3d 1576 (finding harmless the district court's error in
applying section 112, 6).
27 0.1. Corp., 115 F.3d at 1584.
28 Id. at 1583.
23

21Id.
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29
with means, acts go with steps.

The court also emphasized that "section 112, 6, is implicated only when means
plus function without definite structure are present, and that is similarly true with
respect to steps, that the paragraph is implicated only when steps plus function
30
without acts are present."
The court suggests that where a claim recites a series of steps without also
reciting corresponding functions, then § 112, 6 will not apply: "[C]laiming a step by
itself, or even a series of steps, does not implicate section 112, 6. Merely claiming a
step without recital of a function is not analogous to a means plus a function."3 1 In
this regard, it is noted that in the present case, the Federal Circuit had found "[tihe
steps of 'passing' are not individually associated in the claim with functions
32
performed by the steps of passing."
The court also cautioned against construing every method limitation as a stepplus-function limitation or treating every "ing" gerund as a step-plus-function
limitation:
We note that the Halliburton case concerned an apparatus claim, not a
process claim, and we must be careful not to extend the language of this
provision to situations not contemplated by Congress. If we were to
construe every process claim containing steps described by an "ing" verb,
such as passing, heating, reacting, transferring, etc. into a step-plusfunction limitation, we would be limiting process claims in a manner never
33
intended by Congress.
The court also rejected using the recitation of a function in the preamble of a
claim as a reason for converting individual limitations into step-plus-function or as
serving as the function of the individual steps recited thereafter:
The district court considered the statement which appears in the preamble,
"removing water vapor from an analyte slug," as a function which invokes
application of section 112, 6. We do not agree. The preamble statement of
the purpose of the overall process does not constitute an associated function
for the two "passing" steps of claim 9. Performing a series of steps
inherently produces a result, in this case the removal of water vapor from
the analyte slug, but a statement in a preamble of a result that necessarily
follows from performing a series of steps does not convert each of those
steps into step-plus-function clauses.
The steps of "passing" are not
individually associated in the claim with functions performed by the steps of
34
passing.

Id. at 1582-83.
Id. at 1583.
31 Id.
32 Jd
29

30

3 Id
34 Id.
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Significantly, the Federal Court clearly and unequivocally rejected the argument
that because the language of a method claim limitation parallels a means-plusfunction limitation in another claim, the method claim limitation should also be
found to invoke § 112,
6. 35 In this case, a similarly written apparatus claim was
also asserted. This claim and claim 9 are reproduced below.
U.S. Patent No. 5,470,380

U.S. Patent No. 5,358,557

17. An apparatus for removing
water vapor from an analyte slug
passing between a sparge vessel, trap
and analytical instrument, comprising:

i

(a) Arst means for passing the

9. A method for removing water
vapor from an analyte slug passing
between a sparge vessel, trap and gas
chromatograph, comprising the steps of:
(a) passing the analyte slug through

analyte slug through a passage heated

a passage heated to a first temperature

to a first temperature higher than
ambient, as the analyte slug passes
from the sparge vessel to the trap; and

higher than ambient, as the analyte slug
passes from the sparge vessel to the
trap; and

(b) second means for passing the
analyte slug through the passage that is
air cooled to a second temperature
below said first temperature but not
below ambient, as the analyte slug
passes from the trap to the analytical
36
instrument.

(b) passing the analyte slug through
thepassage that is air cooled to a second
temperature below said first
temperature but not below ambient, as
the analyte slug passes from the trap to
37
the gas chromatograph.

In the present case, it was agreed that the "first means" and "second means" of
claim 17 were means-plus-function limitations. 38 In rejecting the accused infringer's
parallelism argument, the court stated:
We understand that the steps in the method claim are essentially in the
same language as the limitations in the apparatus claim, albeit without the
"means for" qualification.

However ....

we would not agree ...

that the

"parallelism" of the claims means that the method claims should be subject
to the requirements of section 112, 6. Each claim must be independently
reviewed in order to determine if it is subject to the requirements of section
112,

6.

39

Finally, the court indicates the invocation of § 112,
may choose to invoke it or not:

6 is optional-a patentee

3I5d
36 U.S. Patent No. 5,470,380 col. 10 (filed Nov. 28, 1995) (emphasis added).
37 U.S. Patent No. 5,358,557 col. 10 (filed May 14, 1993) (emphasis added).
38 0. Corp., 115 F.3d at 1580.
3) Id. at 1583.
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The statute thus in effect provides that an element in a combination method
or process claim may be recited as a step for performing a specified function
without the recital of acts in support of the function. Being drafted with the
permissive "may," the statute does not require that steps in a method claim
40
be drafted in step-plus-function form but rather allows for that form.

C. Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Construction
Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Construction41 was decided on April 1,
1999 per curiam by a panel consisting of Judges Newman, Rader, and Bryson. 42 As
will be explained below, it is the concurring opinion by Judge Rader which this
author believes may have unnecessarily complicated step-plus-function analysis and
made its application uncertain. Before, addressing this concurring opinion, the
decision of the court will be addressed.

1. Background
Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 4,529,622 ('622 patent") is reproduced below with
the limitation in dispute emphasized:
1. A method for constructing an activity mat over a foundation
comprising the steps of:
spreading an adhesve tack coating for adherng the mat to the
foundation over the foundation surface;
spreading a first uniform layer of particulate rubber over the tack
coating;
then, in sequence, first applying a liquid latex binder to the previously
spread rubber layer in sufficient quantity to coat substantially all rubber
particles of said layer then air drying said applied mixture until
substantially no liquid is visible, then spreading a succeeding uniform layer
of particulate rubber uniformly over the preceding layers; and
continuing the aforesaid sequential application of latex binder, air
drying the binder followed by the spreading of a uniform layer of rubber
over the preceding layers until the approximate desired thickness for the
43
mat is achieved.

Id
172 F.3d 836 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
42 Id. at 838.
43 U.S. Patent No. 4,529,622 cols. 5-6 (filed Sept. 4, 1984) (emphasis added); Seal-Flex, 172
F.3d at 838.
40
41
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This case was very unusual because both parties agreed during the district court
proceeding and on appeal that § 112,
6 applied to the phrase "spreading an
adhesive tack coating for adhering the mat to the foundation over the foundation
surface."44 However, they disagreed whether it implicated step-plus-function or
46
means-plus-function. 45 The jury instructions combined and confused the two.
While confusing, it appears that the district court was actually interpreting the
phrase "an adhesive tack coating for adheringthe mat to the foundation' as a meansplus-function limitation. 47 The jury found infringement under § 112, 6,48 and this
49
determination was affirmed on appeal.
There was no assertion of non-infringement based on how the adhesive tack
coating was spread; 50 but rather, the issue between the parties was whether latex
51
was encompassed by the term "adhesive tack coating."

2. Per Curiam Opinion
For the purpose of the appeal, the court accepted that § 112, 6 applied to this
limitation as that was never challenged by the parties below or on appeal. 52 More
specifically, the court stated: "Because both parties agree to the application of § 112,
6, the only issue before this court is whether substantial evidence supports the jury
finding of equivalence between latex, as used by Athletic Track, and the materials
53
disclosed for performing the "adhering" function in the '622 patent specification."
The court found there was substantial evidence that latex was an equivalent of
the materials disclosed in the specification and hence affirmed the decision of the
jury. 54 The court's decision did reiterate that "in § 112, 6, 'structure' and 'material'
are associated with means-plus-function claim elements while 'acts' is associated
with step-plus-function claim elements." 55 Additionally, all the judges on the panel
agreed that determining whether a method claim limitation invokes § 112, 6 can be
difficult. 56

44

Sea-Flex, 172 F.3d at 841-82.

45 Id. at 843 n.3.
46 Id. at 843; id. at 847 (Rader, J., concurring).
47 Id. at 843 ("[T]he district court limited the term 'adhesive tack coating' to the 'material

described . . . in the specification and equivalents thereof,' i.e., the 'suitable tack coating materials'
disclosed in the specification and those which 'result[ ] from an insubstantial change which adds
nothing of significance to the materials disclosed."').
48 Id. ([T]he jury determined that latex qualified as an equivalent tack coating material to
those disclosed in the specification of the '622 patent.").
49 Id. at 845.
50 Id. at 844. The accused adhesive tack was actually sprayed on the foundation so there may
have actually been an argument that it was not "spread."
51

Id. at 842.

52 Id. at

843.
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 852 (Bryson, J., and Newman, J., concurring).
54 Id. at 844-45.
5 Id. at 843 (citing 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
56 Id. at 852 (Bryson, J., and Newman, J., concurring) ([T]he question whether the claim at
issue is a step-plus-function claim is a difficult one .... "); id. at 848 (Rader, J., concurring) (noting
"the difficult process of identifying step-plus-function claim elements"); id. at 848-49 (Rader, J.,
5
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3. Rader's ConcurringOpinion
Judge Rader wrote a concurring opinion indicating that he believed the court
was obligated to "independently determine whether § 112,
6 applies to the claim
element at issue in this case." 57

He further stated, "I believe that identifying

whether this element is a means-plus-function element, a step-plus-function element,
or neither, is crucial to a proper determination

of this case."5 8

Judge Rader

ultimately concluded that the disputed phrase contained neither a step-plus-function
59
limitation nor a means-plus-function limitation.
Based on the statute, Judge Rader agreed that "acts" goes with "steps." 60 More
specifically, he stated, "[A] claim element deserves step-plus-function treatment
when 'expressed as a ...step for performing a specified function without the recital
61
of... acts in support thereof."'

While Judge Rader recognized that means and step-plus-function claims
elements are different and require distinct analysis, 6 2 he nonetheless suggested that
63
courts should look to the case law dealing with means-plus-function for guidance
even though that law is itself complicated and confusing. 64
concurring) ("The difficulty of distinguishing acts from functions in step-plus-function claim
elements, however, makes identifying step-plus-function claims inherently more problematic.").
57Id.at 847.
58s
Id.
59

Id. at 851.

60 Id.at 848.

(31Id.
G2 d
6:3Id.('[T]he language of § 112,

6 and this court's means-plus-function case law give guidance
for determining whether a claim element is in step-plus-function form so as to invoke the statute's
claim interpretation requirements.").
61Id. at 848-49.
Step-plus-function, like means-plus-function, claims are complicated and
confusing for federal courts to construe. See Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1009,
1018 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Plager, J., concurring) (stating that in regard to means-plus-function claims,
the "law in this area [is] confused and confusing"); Rudolph P. Hofmann, Jr. & Edward P. Heller, III,
The Rosetta Stone for the Doctrines of Means-Plus-FunctionPatent Claims, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 227, 232-43 (1997) (discussing the difficulty of using means-plus-function claim

language); Scott G. Ulbrich, Festo, Notice and the Application of Prosecution History Estoppel to
Means -PlusFunction Claim Limitations, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1165, 1172 (2002) ("The
theoretical analysis of the law applied to means-plus-function is seemingly straightforward.
However, because the means-plus-function analysis adds an extra layer of complexity to an already
complex patent suit, the application of these principles is often complex and confusing."); Eva M.
Ogielska, Note, IMS Technology, Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc. & Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control
Papers Co., 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 71, 71 (2001) (stating that "[t]he difficulties of claim
interpretation are particularly apparent in the judicial construction of means-plus-function claims");
Jeffrey A. Berkowitz, Claim Construction Issues In Business Method Patents, 688 PRAC. L. INST.
295, 336 (2002) ("In the complicated world of claim construction, interpreting the scope of meansplus-function elements under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 can be particularly confusing."); Lawrence Kass,

Comment, Computer Software Patentability and the Role of Means-Plus-Function Format in
Computer Software Claims, 15 PACE L. REV. 787, 850 (1995) (stating the construing of means-plusfunction claims "has bred confusion and controversy"); Evan R. Sotiriou, 35 US.C. § 114
6Means For Better Patent Protection, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1065, 1087 (2003) ("The difficulty in
construing means-plus-function elements is sometimes cited as a reason to avoid them.").
That means-plus-function is confusing is also supported by empirical studies. See Kimberly A.
Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 231, 239-42 (2005). Moore's recent study analyzed all precedential, non-precedential, and Rule
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Judge Rader himself recognized the process of identifying whether a step is a
step-plus-function limitation is a "difficult process. ' 65 He even went on to state that
the process is even more problematic than for means-plus-function as he believes it is
harder to distinguish the recitation of an "act" from the recitation of a "function" as
opposed to a recitation of a "structure" or "material" from a recitation of a
"function."66 Specifically, Judge Rader admitted, "The difficulty of distinguishing
acts from functions in step-plus-function claim elements, however, makes identifying
67
step -plus-function claims inherently more problematic."
Nonetheless and despite the inherent difficulties, Judge Rader indicated that
because the language of the statute recites means-plus-function and step-plusfunction using a parallel format, the case law concerning means-plus-function should
6
be applied to step -plus-function analysis. 8
Accordingly, in a similar fashion as with means-plus-function, certain language
will create a presumption that § 112, 6 applies; and conversely, the absence of such
language will create the opposite presumption that § 112, 6 does not apply. While
for means-plus-function, the special language is the word "means," for step-plusfunction the special language is "step for." 69 Judge Rader makes it clear that it is
only the precise phrase "step for" as opposed to just the word "step" or the phrase
"step of' that invokes the presumption of the applicability of § 112, 6.70 In fact, he
makes it clear that the use of the phrase "step of' creates the presumption that § 112,
71
6 does not apply.
The most significant problem arising from Judge Rader's analysis is that at best
a patentee can only voluntarily and unambiguously decide to either invoke a
presumption that § 112, 6 applies or invoke a presumption that § 112, 6 does not
apply to steps of a method claim. However, this is only a presumption. As a result,
each and every step limitation must be carefully analyzed to see whether the
presumption, one way or the other, has been rebutted. That is, even when the
patentee uses the phrase "step for," the courts and the public would need to
determine if the limitation recites "sufficient acts for performing the specified

36 summary affirmance decisions of the Federal Circuit on claim construction from the Supreme
Court's Markman decision (1996) through 2003. Id. at 239. That study found the rate of district
court errors on means-plus-function terms upon appellate review was 39.3%. Id. at 242. However,
when means-plus-function language appeals were removed from the study, the rate of district court
error was only 33.4%. Id. at 243. Therefore, the study concluded district courts struggle more with
means-plus-function claims than with regular claims. Id. The study further found that in 15. 2 % of
means-plus-function term appeals, the district court wrongly evaluated whether means-plus
function language, and thus § 112,
6, even applied. Id. See also Christian A. Chu, Empirical
Analysis of the FedoralCircuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1131-36

(2001).
Seal-Flex, 172 F.3d at 848.
(3c,
Id.
65

(37Id.
68

at 848-49.

Id. at 848.

( Id. at 848-49.
70 Id. at 849. "[T]he phrase 'step for' in a method claim raises a presumption that § 112,
6
applies." Id. However, "use of the word 'step,' by itself, does not invoke a presumption that § 112,
6 applies." id. "The phrase 'steps of colloquially signals the introduction of specific acts, rather
than functions, and should therefore not presumptively invoke application of § 112, 6." Id.
71 Id.
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function"7 2 in which case the presumption is rebutted and § 112, 6 does not apply.
Conversely, even if the patentee does not use the phrase "step for," the courts and the
public would need to determine if the limitation contains acts for performing the
73
function associated with the step.
Judge Rader cautioned that when analyzing a series of presumed acts (steps in a
claim not using the "step for" language), it is the function of each individual step that
must be determined, not the function of the overall claim as may be recited in the
74
preamble.
A significant problem directly follows from the proposed test for determining
whether the presumption that § 112, 6 does not apply has been rebutted. As stated
above, the test for rebutting this presumption is whether an individual limitation
"merely claim[s] the underlying function without recitation of acts for performing
that function." 75 The problem is for method claims employing the "steps of'
transition followed by a series of presumed acts, each step reciting a presumed act
will likely not have any recited "function" associated with it. Where a patentee has
chosen to invoke the presumption that a recited step is itself an act, that step will
often not contain additional words such as a recitation of a function. After all,
unnecessarily reciting a function could serve to undesirably further limit the claim or
at least provide additional fodder for an accused infringer to argue for
noninfringement.
Rather, this test will degenerate into the basic question of whether the recited
gerund is the function or an act having an unrecited function. Judge Rader himself
recognized this inherent problem with his proposed procedure:
Unfortunately, method claim elements often recite phrases susceptible to
interpretation as either a function or as an act for performing a function.
Both acts and functions are often stated using verbs ending in "ing." For
instance, if the method claim element at issue in this case had merely
recited the "step of' "spreading an adhesive tack coating," it would not have
been clear solely from this hypothetical claim language whether "spreading"
was a function or an act. In such circumstances, claim interpretation
requires careful analysis of the limitation in the context of the overall claim
76
and the specification.
Furthermore, Judge Rader advised "[i]f the language of the claim element does
not expressly state its function, the function of that element may nonetheless be
discernible from the context of the overall claim and the disclosure in the
77
specification."
72 Id. ("Even when a claim element uses language that generally falls under the step-plusfunction format, however, § 112, 6 still does not apply when the claim limitation itself recites
sufficient acts for performing the specified function.").
73 Id. ("However, claim elements without express step-plus-function language may nevertheless

fall within § 112,

6 if they merely claim the underlying function without recitation of acts for

performing that function.").
74

Id. at 850.

7, Id. at 849.
76

Jd

77

Id. at 850.
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Apparently realizing that claim construction under his proposed approached
would most often degenerate into a debate over whether a particular gerund is an act
or a function, Judge Rader offered the following guidance:
In general terms, the "underlying function" of a method claim element
corresponds to what that element ultimately accomplishes in relationship to
what the other elements of the claim and the claim as a whole accomplish.
"Acts," on the other hand, correspond to how the function is accomplished.
Therefore, claim interpretation focuses on what the claim limitation
accomplishes, i.e., it's [sic] underlying function, in relation to what is
accomplished by the other limitations and the claim as a whole. If a claim
element recites only an underlying function without acts for performing it,
78
then § 112, 6 applies even without express step-plus-function language.
Given the above potential problems, it may be helpful to examine how Judge
Rader utilized his "how" vs. "what" /"act" vs. "function" approach in the case at hand.
As an initial matter, he noted that the claim used the phrase "steps of' in the
preamble and hence invoked the presumption that the recited steps were acts as
opposed to functions.7 9 He next looked to see if the presumption was rebutted by
attempting to determine "whether the claim element recites only the underlying
function of the element itself as opposed to an act for performing it."80 As stated
above, the limitation in dispute was "spreading an adhesive tack coating for adhering
the mat to the foundation over the foundation surface."8 1 Judge Rader's procedure
requires the determination of the "function" of the "spreading" step. 8 2 Judge Rader
stated the function of this limitation was explicitly recited in the limitation itself,
namely, "adhering the mat to the foundation."8 3 Accordingly, Judge Rader found
that this limitation was not a step-plus-limitation because the function of "adhering
84
the mat to the foundation" was achieved by the act of "spreading."
Unfortunately, a closer review of the limitation reveals that the step of
"spreading" does not correspond to the function of "adhering the mat to the
foundation." Rather, if anything, adhering the mat to the foundation would be the
function of the adhesive tack coating. As is apparent from the claim, it is the coating
that causes the subsequently applied layer(s) of particulate rubber forming the mat
to be adhered to the foundation, not the step of spreading the coating on the ground.
It is clear from the language of the claim that the spreading of the coating cannot
serve the function of adhering the mat to the ground as the mat would not even exist
at the time the spreading step is performed.85

7S Id.at

849-50.

7)Id.at 850.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id
84 Id.

85U.S. Patent No. 4,529,622 cols. 5-6 (filed Sept. 4, 1984) (See the language of the next step of
claim 1, e.g., the next step is "spreading a first uniform layer of particulate rubber over the tack
coating.") (emphasis added).
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Given that "adhering the mat to the foundation" is not the function of the step of
"spreading," Judge Rader's procedure suggests one should use the how/what test to
ascertain the function and the act associated with this limitation. However, the
application of the how/what test is not unambiguous. For example, is the function of
this limitation perhaps the unrecited function of distributing or applying the
adhesive tack coating over the foundation while the step of "spreading" indicates how
the coating is distributed over the foundation? That is, does the limitation serve to
indicate that the coating must be spread as opposed to being applied in some other
fashion? If so, then under Judge Rader's analysis, the step of "spreading" is an act as
it goes to how the function of applying the coating is achieved.
On the other hand, is the recited step of "spreading" actually the function? If so,
the claim limitation does not explain "how" the coating is spread over the foundation.
For example, the claim limitation does not specify whether the coating is spread with
a brush or a roller or whether it is spread in a circular manner or in a back-and-forth
manner. As a result, the step of "spreading" would be a step-plus-function limitation
as the limitation does not recite or further limit how the coating is spread.
These questions are not addressed by Judge Rader and his proposed analytical
approach does not seem to provide a clear answer. It is also interesting to note that
86
the accused infringer actually applied the coating by spraying it on the foundation.
If the claim were to be held to be a step-plus-function, it would appear the accused
infringer could potentially have had an argument that its act of spraying was not the
same or equivalent to the acts described in the patent for "spreading" the coating on
the foundation.
Judge Rader also set about to determine whether the phrase "adhesive tack
coating [for adhering the mat to the foundation] was a means-plus-function
limitation."87 He concluded that it was not a means-plus-function limitation because
(1) it did not use the word "means" and (2) it contained "a sufficient disclosure of
material for performing the claimed function to preclude application of § 112, 6."88
While his opinion did not specifically identify the function associated with "adhesive
tack coating," he doubtless found the corresponding function to be "adhering the mat
to the foundation." However, given that "adhering the mat to the foundation" is the
corresponding function for the "adhesive tact coating" under a means-plus-function
analysis, it becomes even clearer that that same function could not also be the
corresponding function for the "spreading" limitation under a step-plus-function
analysis.

4. Conelusion Regarding the ProposedApproach
While Judge Rader maintains that his proposed procedure provides a
"straightforward analysis for identifying a step-plus-function claim" similar to the
"straightforward analysis" for means-plus-function claims, 8 9 it seems doubtful to the

86 Seal-Flex, 172 F.3d at 840.
87 Id. at 851.

88 Id
8$)Id. at 850.
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author that the analysis will be perceived by litigants, the courts, and the public as
being straightforward.
As can been seen from the above, in most cases, the proposed approach will
require courts to engage in a "careful analysis of the limitation in the context of the
overall claim and the specification." 90 Moreover, the public notice function of the
claims will likely be impeded. For the public to know the boundaries of what is being
claimed, it must predict the results a court will reach after such careful analysis.
Given that such a thorough and complicated analysis must be undertaken, it would
seem all but certain that different courts could arrive at different conclusions; and
hence, method claims could cease to serve their fundamental purpose of informing
the public as to the scope of the claimed invention.

D. Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Great Plains Chemical Co.
Six months after rendering his Sea]-Flexconcurring opinion, Judge Rader wrote
the decision in Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Great Plains Chemical Co.91 on October 6,
1999.92 Judges Plager and Bryson were also on the panel. 93
In granting a motion for summary judgment of non-infringement, the district
court below held certain claim limitations were not step-plus-function limitations but
nonetheless the accused method fell outside the scope of the claim limitations. 94 In
reversing the finding on non-infringement of the disputed method claims, the Federal
Circuit stated that the accused method would infringe the method claims regardless
of whether the disputed limitations were found to be step-plus-function limitations or
not. 95 As a result, the Federal Circuit declined to determine whether the disputed
96
limitations were step-plus-function limitations or not.
Rather, it first assumed the disputed limitations were step-plus-function
limitations and discussed why the accused method met the disputed limitations as
construed under § 112, 6. The court then assumed the disputed limitations were
not step-plus-function limitations and discussed why the limitations were
97
nonetheless present in the accused method.
The method claims at issue were claims 63, 93, and 94 of U.S. Patent No.
4,733,971.98
Claims 63 and 93 are reproduced below with the disputed claim
limitations emphasized.

90Id.at 849.
91194 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
92Id. at 1250.
9:3Id.
94 Micro

Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., No. 88-Z-499, 1997 US Dist. LEXIS 23653, at
**10-16 (D. Co. Nov. 19, 1997), aflfd in part,rev'din part,194 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (reversing
district court's finding of non-infringement as to the three method claims).
9 Micro Chem., 194 F.3d at 1259 ('[B]ecause this court concludes that the method claims
would be infringed whether or not interpreted under § 112, 6, this court does not address whether
the district court was correct in finding the method claims not in step-plus-function form.").
97Id. at
98 Id. at

1259-60.
1254.
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63. A method of dispensing and delivering microingredient feed
additives into a livestock feed ration shortly before delivering the feed
ration to the livestock for consumption, comprising the steps:
storing separately multiple said additives in concentrate form;
dispensing predetermined weights of selected said additive
concentrates into a liquid carrier with no substantial intermixing of the
additive concentrates before they enter the liquid carrier;
intermixing the additive concentrates in the liquid carrier to dilute,
disperse, and suspend them and form a liquid carrier- additive slurry;
directing the slurry to a receiving station while maintaining the
suspension and dispersion of the additives until delivered into a feed ration;
and
determining the predetermined weights of selected additives by the
step of measuring the predetermined weights while isolating the measuring
means from influences that would affect the measuring function so that
accurate weight determinations are obtained.

93. A method of dispensing and delivering formulations of
microingredient feed additives into a livestock feed ration at a feedlot
shortly before delivering the feed ration to the livestock for consumption,
comprising the steps:
storing separately multiple said additives in concentrate form;
weighing predetermined amounts of selected said additives, with no
substantial intermixing of the selected additives during the weighing
process;
discharging the weighed amounts of the selected additives into a
mixing vessel;
introducing a liquid carrier into the mixing vessel;
intermixing the liquid carrier and weighed amounts of selected
additives in the mixing vessel to form a slurry within the mixing vessel; and
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conveying the slurry to a receiving station while maintaining the
weighed amounts of additive concentrates in suspension and dispersion
until the slurry is delivered into a feed ration. 99
The Federal Circuit stated the specification disclosed three acts for performing
the function of "dispensing predetermined weights of microingredients without
substantial intermixing prior to entry into the liquid" including a prior art dump
method employed by the accused infringer. 100 Accordingly, the limitations would be
literally met if the limitations were step-plus-function limitations.10 1 Further, the
court found that if the limitations were not step-plus-function limitations, the
accused dump method satisfied the ordinarily understood meaning of the disputed
limitations. 102

E. Generation II Orthotics, Inc. v. Medical Technologies, Inc.
Generation H Orthotics, Inc. v. Medical Technologies, Inc.10 3 was decided on
August 15, 2001 by a panel consisting of Judges Newman, Dyk, and Linn (opinion
written by Judge Linn). Exemplary claims of U.S. Pat. No. 5,302,169 including one
apparatus claim and one method claim are reproduced below with the disputed "joint
means" and "joint" limitations emphasized.
1. In an orthopaedic brace comprising:
a pair of arms to be secured to a wearer's body, a pivotable joint
between said arms to allow pivoting of the knee while supporting the knee,
the improvement comprising:
joint means in the brace for allowing controlled media' and lateral
inclination of each rigid arm relative to the pivotablejoint.

16. A method of bracing a knee of a patient following high tibial
osteotomy comprising:
locating a brace about the knee, said brace having a pair of arms to
contact the leg of the patient and a pivotable joint between said arms to
allow pivoting of the knee while supporting the knee, a joint in the brace to
allow controlled medial and lateral inclination of each arm relative to a
pivotable joint, and

99U.S. Patent No. 4,733,971 cols. 29, 35-36 (filed Feb. 26, 1986) (emphasis added).

100Micro Chem., 194 F.3d at 1259-60.
101Id. at 1260.
102Id.
103 263

F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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adjusting the inclination to provide the required bracing at the
required inclination. 104

The "joint means" limitation was undisputed to be a means-plus-function
limitation. With respect to the method claim, the Federal Circuit stated:
The district court determined that § 112, paragraph 6, applies to
method claim 16 .... In making this determination, the court relied solely

on the fact that the limitations recited in these method claims were similar
to the means-plus-function limitations recited in claim 1 of the 169
patent....
We hold that the district court erred in its determination that
paragraph 6 of § 112 applied to claim 16 of the 169 patent .... The district
court's decision and reasoning directly contradict this court's previous
holdings regarding the applicability of § 112, paragraph 6, to method
claims. The mere fact that a method claim is drafted with language parallel
to an apparatus claim with means-plus-function language does not mean
that the method claim should be subject to an analysis under § 112,
paragraph 6. Rather, each limitation of each claim must be independently
reviewed to determine if it is subject to the requirements of § 112,
paragraph 6.105
In analyzing the method claim, the court was careful to separate step-plusfunction analysis that it applied to the recited step from means-plus-function
analysis that it applied to the structural term "joint," which appeared in the method
limitation. In this regard, the court stated:
[Cilaim 16 ...recite[s] "locating a brace about the knee" and "adjusting the
inclination" of the brace arms. In addition, [this claim] include[s] the
phrase "a joint in the brace to allow controlled medial and lateral
inclination of each arm relative to a pivotable joint." Because claim 16
[does] not use the words "means for" with regard to the structural "joint"
limitation, and [does] not use the words "step for" with regard to the
"locating" and "adjusting" steps, there is a presumption that these
limitations are not subject to section 112, paragraph 6. Furthermore, these
limitations contain no language that would overcome the presumption.
Consequently, the district court erred by construing claim 16... to have the
same scope as claim 1 when, instead, it should have construed each claim
1 06

independently.

Noteworthy, in reversing the finding that § 112, 6 applied, the Federal Circuit
rejected the assertion "that the district court was correct in stating that it would
'undermine the compromise struck by § 112, paragraph 6, if a patentee could avoid
U.S. Patent No. 5,302,169 cols. 6, 8 (filed Jan. 4, 1993) (emphasis added).
105 GenerationII Orthoti s, 263 F.3d at 1368 (citations omitted).
106 Id. (citations omitted).
104
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the strictures of that section by simply embedding a purely functional description of a
patented device in a method claim."' 107

F. Epcon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc.
Epeon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc.108 was decided on February
1, 2002 with Judge Linn authoring the opinion for a panel also comprising Judges
Mayer and Clevenger. 109 The method claim that was in dispute was claim 2 of U.S.
Patent No. 5,118,455, which is reproduced below with the disputed limitation
emphasized.
2. A method of providing gas assistance to a resin injection molding
process of the type in which hot resin is injected into a mold, gas is injected
into the mold to displace a portion of the resin in the mold, the resin cools,
the gas is vented and the mold is opened to remove the molded part, a
supply of stored [gias is provided, the gas is injected into the mold to
displace the resin in the mold cavity at a pressure that is at all times during
the gas injection cycle substantially below the pressure of the stored gas
supply, the improvement wherein, following the initial injection of the gas
into the mold and prior to the venting of the gas from the mold, the gas
pressure within the mold is selectively increased decreased, or held
substantially constant depending upon the particular requirements of the
110
molding process.
The patent also included a similar apparatus claim (claim 16) that recited
"control means" to selectively increase, decrease, or maintain the gas pressure
following the initial injection of the gas into the mold and prior to the venting of the
gas from the mold."'
The parties agreed that the "control means" in the
112
corresponding apparatus claim was a means-plus-function limitation.
The district court applied § 112,
6 to the disputed claim language because it
11 3
thought that claim 2 was drafted in step-plus-function form.
In reversing the district court's finding that the disputed limitation was a stepplus-function limitation, the Federal Circuit stated the "district court erred in its
finding that the limitations of claim 2 must be interpreted according to § 112,
paragraph 6 consistently with [the control means recited in apparatus] claim 16,
without independently evaluating application of § 112, paragraph 6 to claim 2."114 In
this regard and citing O.1 Corp., the court stated:
107

Id. at 1368.

279 F.3d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1022.
110
U.S. Patent No. 5,118,455 col. 17 (filed Feb. 15, 1991) (emphasis added).
111 Epcon Gas, 279 F.3d at 1022.
108
109

112

Id. at 1032.

Epcon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 838, 844 (E.D. Mich.
2000), affd in part, revd in pa±rt, 279 F.3d 1022 (reversing the district court's finding that the
disputed limitation was a step-plus-function limitation).
114 Epcon Gas, 279 F.3d at 1028.
113
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[M]ethod claims that "parallel," or have limitations similar to, apparatus
claims admittedly subject to § 112, paragraph 6 are not necessarily subject
to the requirements of § 112, paragraph 6.
"Each claim must be
independently reviewed in order to determine if it is subject to the
requirements of § 112, paragraph 6."115
In this case, the Federal Circuit stated:
An independent evaluation of claim 2 shows that it is not subject to § 112,
paragraph 6. The claim includes no words indicating "step plus function"
form, such as "step for." The claim recites a series of steps without the
recital of function. As noted in 0.1 Corp., a preamble statement of purpose
does not necessarily supply a function for "step plus function" form. Claim
2 is a garden variety process claim. The district court erred in analyzing
claim 2 according to § 112, paragraph 6.116
As indicated in the above passage, the Federal Circuit found the claim recited a
series of steps without the recital of function, and hence, did not invoke § 112, 6.117
While the court did cite with approval the portion of Judge Rader's Seal-Flex
concurring opinion concerning the phrase "step for" indicating function, it did not rely
on the other portion of this concurring opinion nor did it engage in the analytical
procedure proposed therein such as attempting to identify unrecited functions for
steps or delving into a how/what analysis.
The accused method employed one and the same valve for selectively reducing
gas pressure and for the final venting of the gas. 118 The accused infringer had
maintained that because the disputed limitation was a step-plus-function limitation
and the specification only disclosed the use of separate valves for selectively reducing
gas pressure versus final venting of the gas, the accused method was outside the
scope of the claim. 119 However, because the Federal Circuit reversed the finding that
the limitation invoked § 112, 6, the court rejected the attempt to limit the claim
limitation to only the two-valved system disclosed in the specification.1 20 Instead,
the court pointed out that the "method of claim 2 does not mention structure by
which the 'venting' is to be performed," and thus it was improper to incorporate such
121
structural limitations into the claim.

G. Masco Corp. v. United States
Masco Corp. v. United States122 was decided on August 28, 2002, six months
after Epeon Gas, by a panel comprising Judges Newman, Clevenger, and Linn.
11H5
Id. (citing 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
116
Id. (citations omitted).
117 Id.
118 Id. at
119 Id.

1031.

120

Id.

121

Id. at 1032.
303 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

122
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Judge Linn again authored the opinion. 123 An exemplary method claim in dispute
was claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 5,540,068, which is reproduced below with the
language alleged by the government to be to step-plus-function limitation
emphasized.
1. A method of controlling an electronic lock including a dial, a
rotatable cam wheel operably connected to the dial and defining a surface, a
locking mechanism movable between a locked position and an unlocked
position, and a movable lever operably connected to the locking mechanism
and having a protrusion adapted to engage the cam wheel, the method
comprising the steps of:
holding the lever in a position where the protrusion cannot contact the
surface of the cam wheel and in such a manner that the lever and the dial
are operably disconnected and the lever will not move in response to
rotation of the dial;
electronically determining whether an input combination corresponds
to a predetermined combination;
operably connecting the lever and the dial, while maintaining the lever
in a position where the provision cannot contact the surface of the cam
wheel in response to a determination that the predetermined combination
has been input; and
transmitting a force applied to the dial to the lever after the lever and
the dial have been operably connected to drive the lever to a position where
the protrusion can contact the surface of the cam wheel in such a manner
that the lever will be pulled by the cam wheel during rotation of the cam
wheel. 124
Below, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims found the following limitations not to be
step-plus-function limitations: 125
1) holding the lever in a position where the protrusion cannot contact the
surface of the cam wheel.
2) operably connecting the lever and the dial.

However, the Court of Federal Claims did find the limitation of "transmitting a
force applied to the dial to the lever" to be a step-plus-function limitation.126 This
127
finding was reversed by the Federal Circuit.
Id. at 1316-18.
U.S. Patent No. 5,540,068 col. 8 (filed May 2, 1994) (emphasis added).
125 Masco Corp. v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 449, 454-55 (Ct. Cl. 2000), affd in part, rev'd in
part,303 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
123
124
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1. U.S. Court of FederalClaims Opinion
In its consideration of the step-plus-function issues below, the Federal Claims
Court cited 0.. Corp. for the applicable step-plus-function law, noting that "[tihe
most important part of [O.. Corp.] is 'with respect to steps, [section 112,
paragraph 6] is implicated only when steps plus function without acts are
present."' 128 The Federal Claims Court went on to state "[t]hus, in deciding whether
a particular limitation is a 'step plus function' limitation, this Court will examine the
patent to see whether any act is present. If an act is present, then the limitation is
129
not a step plus function limitation."
The Federal Claims Court then looked to Judge Rader's concurring opinion in
Sea]-Flex for the test for distinguishing acts and functions. 130 Even though the
Federal Claims Court recognized that Judge Rader's opinion was his own and not
binding, the court still followed it because it felt the opinion was "well-reasoned and
persuasive."13 1
Using Rader's test, the Federal Claims Court held that "holding" is an act. 132 In
reaching this conclusion the Federal Claims Court stated:
When compared to how levers in prior technology acted [namely, they
moved], "holding" is doing something.

... Here, the act (or how the function is accomplished) is the holding still
without movement.

A person with ordinary skill in the art would understand that "holding"
the lever means that the lever does not move. Accordingly, since "holding"
is an act, and since a limitation with an act cannot be a step plus function
limitation, this limitation is not a step plus function limitation. 133
The Federal Claims Court also applied Judge Rader's proposed presumption
that § 112,

134
6 did not apply given that the phrase "steps of' was used in the claim.

Here, the Federal Claims Court stated the "[diefendant has not presented a
13 5
persuasive argument to deviate from this presumption."
The Federal Claims Court also applied the Rader test to hold that "connecting"
is an act. 136 In doing so, the court noted that after the combination has been entered
126

Id. at 455.

127
128

Maseo Corp., 303 F.3d at 1327.
Masco Cop., 47 Fed. Cl. at 453.

129

Id.

Id. (citing Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 172 F.3d 836 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(Rader, J., concurring)).
130

131 Id. at
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id
136 Id. at

454.

455.
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"[a] person skilled in the art would understand that the machinery in the lock
changes. The lever was separate from the dial. Then, the lever is linked to the dial.
3 7
This change is an act, encapsulated in the phrase 'operably connecting."' 1
The Federal Claims Court then commented about broad and narrow acts:
Some words for "acts" are broad terms, such as "traveling." Other words for
"acts" are more narrow, such as "hiking" or "biking." Simply because
"traveling" includes the more specific concepts "hiking" and "biking," does
not mean that "traveling" is not an act. Likewise, "connecting" remains an
138
act, even though the connection can be achieved using different methods.
The third limitation that the court construed was "transmitting." The court
13 9
applied the same analysis, but concluded that "transmitting" was not an act.
Appling the Rader test, the court determined:
The word "transmitting" without more does not explain how the force is
transmitted. "Transmitting" makes sense only when considered in context
of what the function accomplishes, which is "to drive the lever ... during
rotation of the cam wheel." This limitation sets forth a function, but does
not set forth an act. 140

2. Federal Circuit Opinion
The Federal Circuit reversed the lower court's ruling that "transmitting" was a
step-plus-function limitation, holding that the "transmitting a force" limitation of
claim 1 was indeed an act, not a function, and hence not a step-plus-function
limitation. 141 In doing so, the Federal Circuit clarified the distinction between how
the two possible presumptions should be handled, namely, 1) the presumption that
§ 112, 6 does apply when the draftsman has chosen to use the phrase "step for" and
2) the presumption that § 112, 6 does not apply when the draftsman has chosen not
to use the phrase "step for." 142 With respect to the first presumption that § 112, 6
applies, the Federal Circuit stated that this presumption stands "only when steps
plus function without acts are present." 143 However, when the second presumption
applies, namely, that a limitation is not a step-plus-function limitation, the
presumption can be rebutted only when "the limitation contains nothing that can be
construedas an act."144 More specifically, the Federal Circuit explained:
Where the claim drafter has not signaled his intent to invoke § 112,
paragraph 6 by using the "step[s] for" language, we are unwilling to resort
137

Id.

1:38
Id.
139
140
141
142
143
144

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1326-27.
Id. at 1326 (quoting 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
Id. at 1327 (emphasis added).
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to that provision to constrain the scope of coverage of a claim limitation
without a showing that the limitation contains nothing that can be
construed as an act. Method claims are commonly drafted, as in this case,
by reciting the phrase "steps of' followed by a list of actions comprising the
method claimed. An application of § 112, paragraph 6 in the present
circumstances would render the scope of coverage of these method claims
uncertain and disrupt patentees' settled expectations regarding the scope of
their claims. "[C]ourts must be cautious before adopting changes that
disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing community." We thus hold
that where a method claim does not contain the term "step[s] for," a
limitation of that claim cannot be construed as a step-plus-function
limitation without a showing that the limitation contains no act. 145
First, the Federal Circuit noted that "the Court of Federal Claims properly
examined the claim limitations to see whether any act was present, stating that '[i]f
146
an act is present, then the limitation is not a step plus function limitation."'
The Federal Circuit then applied Judge Rader's Seal-Flex what/how test to find
that "transmitting" can be construed as an act. 147 In this regard, the court
considered dictionary definitions of "transmission" and "transmit" and concluded:
The underlying function of the "transmitting a force" limitations, or in
Judge Rader's formulation, what those limitations ultimately accomplish in
relation to what the other limitations and each claim as a whole accomplish,
is to drive the lever into the cam ....
Transmitting a force" describes how
the lever is driven into the cam. In other words, "transmitting" in the sense
of causing a force to be conveyed through a medium by mechanical parts is
an act, since it describes how the function of the "transmitting a force"
limitation is accomplished. Accordingly, we reverse the holding of the Court
of Federal Claims and hold that the "transmitting a force" limitation ... is
not a step-plus-function limitation. 148

H. Utica Enterprises, Inc. v. Federal Broach & Machine Co.
Judge Lourie authored the Utica Enterprises, Inc. v. FederalBroach & Machine
Co.149 opinion on August 19, 2004 and was joined by Judge Linn. Interestingly, Chief
Judge Mayer dissented without opinion. 150 The claims at issue were claims 1 and 3
of U.S. Patent No. 6,256,857.151 Condensed versions of these claims are reproduced
below with language addressed by the Federal Circuit emphasized.

115
146

Id. (citations omitted).
Id.

147

Id.

148

Id. at 1327-28.

14)

Utica Enters., Inc. v. Fed. Broach & Mach. Co., 109 F. App'x 403, 403-05 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

150

Id. at 411.

11 Id. at 405-07.
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1. A method of retaining a broach cutting tool member in a broach tool
holder, said broach tool holder comprising:
... [a] first planar abutment surface and [a] second planar abutment
surface forming a dihedral right angle, said first and second planar
abutment surfaces further forming a right angle with said top surface;
said broach cutting tool member comprising ...two planar abutment
surfaces adapted to be complementary, respectively, to said first planar and
second planar abutment surfaces, disposed on said broach tool holder...
said method comprising the steps of positioning said two planar
abutment surfaces of said broach cutting tool member contiguous said first
planar and said second planar abutment surfaces, respectively, of said
broach tool holder ... whereby when said broach cutting tool member is
positioned in said broach tool holder a predetermined accurate work
position is established for said broach cutting tool member; and
locking said broach cutting tool member in said predetermined
accurate work position, by imposing a locking force on said at least a
portion of said third planar abutment surface of said broach cutting tool
member, said locking force having a force component directed towards said
two planar abutment surfaces of said broach cutting tool member and a
force component directed downward from said top surface towards said
intermediate surface of said broach tool holder to securely hold said broach
cutting tool member in said broach tool holder

3. A method of retaining a broach cutting tool member in a broach tool
holder, one of said broach cutting tool member and said broach tool holder
having a first top surface and a second lower surface spaced from said first
top surface, said method comprising the steps of
forming a first planar surface on one of said broach cutting tool
member and said broach tool holder;
forming a second planar surface.

positioning said first and second planar surfaces on said one of said
broach cutting tool member and said broach tool holder contiguous to said
respective complementary first and second planar surfaces on said other of
said broach cutting tool member and said broach tool holder whereby ... a
predetermined accurate work position is established; and
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locking said one of said broach cutting tool member and said broach
tool holder in said predetermined accurate work position by imposing a
locking force on said at least a portion of said third planar surface whereby
said locking force generates a force component in a direction downward
from said first top surface towards said second lower surface and a force
component towards said first and second planar surfaces of one of said
152
broach cutting tool member and said broach tool holder.
In the proceedings below, the district court, sua sponte, found two similar
limitations to be step-plus-function limitations even though neither party argued for
the application of § 112,
6.153 The district court found that § 112, 6 is presumed
to apply because the claim used the word "steps" with functions. 154 The district court
then went on to state that the presumption could be "rebutted if the claim itself
recites sufficient structures or materials to perform the stated function." 155 The
court went on to explain that because "Ic]laim 1 does not recite definite structures
that ... generate the locking force, the presumption that § 112,
6, applies is
unrebutted." 156 The Federal Circuit reversed the finding that the limitations invoked
§ 112, 6.157
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with both parties and held that "the
district court erred in interpreting the 'locking' limitations under § 112, 6."158 The
court cleared up the confusing lower court's opinion by explaining that the disputed
"limitations use the phrase 'step of-rather than the phrase 'step for'-and therefore
do not invoke the presumption that they are in step-plus-function format." 159 In this
regard, the Federal Circuit reiterated "[in the context of method claims, use of the
term 'step for' signals the patentee's intent to invoke § 112, 6 and thus gives rise to
160
the presumption that the 'step for' limitations are in step-plus-function format."
Of particular interest, the Federal Circuit stated "[w]ithout 'step for' language,
however, a method claim is subject to the strictures of § 112,
6 only if it recites
steps for performing a specified function but does not recite any act in support of that
function." 161 The court explained that the "locking" limitations at issue "are not stepplus-function limitations because they do not contain steps plus functions without
acts."

162

With respect to the "locking" step of claim 1, the court found that the function of
this step was recited in the claim, namely, "securing the cutting tool in the tool
holder."1 63 Furthermore, the claim also "explains how the tool is secured in the

152 U.S. Patent No. 6,256,857 cols. 7-8 (filed Mar. 8, 1999) (emphasis added).
153 Utica Enters., Inc. v. Fed. Broach & Mach. Co., 258 F. Supp. 2d 706, 715 (E.D. Mich. 2003),
vacated, 109 F. App'x 403.

15 Id.
155 Id.

Id. at 716.
57Utica Enters., Inc., 109 F. App'x at 409.
158 Id.
159 Id. (citing Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
160 Id.(citing Masco Corp., 303 F.3d at 1326).
161
Id. (citing 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (emphasis added).
156

102

Id.

1 3 Id.at

409-10.
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holder-by imposing a locking force on the tool's third planar abutment surface." 164
As a result, the Federal Circuit found that the "locking" limitation of claim 1 "thus
contains an act in support of its specified function and, consequently, does not
implicate § 112, 6."165
Of particular interest, the Court went on to state that the "locking" limitation of
claim 3 was "even farther removed from being in step-plus-function format: it does
not expressly specify the function that the "locking" step is to perform, and it recites
166
the act of imposing a locking force on a portion of the tool's third planar surface."
In this regard, while claim 1 recited the "function" of the "locking" limitation in the
claim, namely, "to securely hold said broach cutting tool member in said broach tool
holder," this language was not present in claim 3. As explained by the court above,
where a limitation is presumed not to invoke § 112, 6, that presumption can "only
[be rebutted] if it recites steps for performing a specified function but does not recite
any act in support of that function." 167 This language comes directly from the statute
which states "[an element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as
a ... step for performing a specified function without the recital of ... acts in support
thereof." 168 Given that claim 3 did not recite "a specified function" for the step of
"locking," the absence from the claim limitation of a specified function as required by
the statute caused the Federal Circuit to conclude that the "locking" limitation of
claim 3 was even farther removed from invoking § 112, 6.169

. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. Saint Jude Medical, Inc.
Two weeks later on August 31, 2004, Judge Newman wrote the opinion in
CardiacPacemakers,Inc. v. Saint Jude Medical,Inc.170 for the panel also comprising
Judges Friedman and Rader. 17 1 In the proceedings below, the district court
considered whether two limitations of claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 4,407,288 were stepplus-function limitations.1 72 This claim is reproduced below with the two limitations
emphasized:
1. A method of heart stimulation using an implantable heart
stimulator capable of detecting a plurality of arrhythmias and capable of
being programmed to undergo a single or multi-mode operation to treat a
detected arrhythmia, corresponding to said mode of operation the method
comprising the steps of:

164
165

I-d. at 410.
Id.

100 Id.
107 Id. at 409 (citing 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (emphasis
added).
1 8 Id. (emphasis added); 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6 (2006).
169 Utica Enters., 109 F. App'x at 410.
170 381 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
171

Id. at 1371-73.

Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. Saint Jude Med., Inc., No. IP 96-1718-C-H/G, 2001 WL 912767,
at *8-14 (S.D. Ind. June 14, 2001), rev'd, 381 F.3d 1371.
172
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(a) determining a condition of the heart from among a plurahty of
conditions of the heart;
(b) selecting at least one mode of operation of the implantable heart
stimulator which operation includes a unique sequence of events
corresponding to said determined condition; and
(c) executing said at least one mode of operation of said implantable
heart stimulator thereby to treat said determined heart condition. 173
The district court found that the "selecting" step (b) did not invoke § 112, 6174
but that the "determining" step (a) did. 175 With respect to the "selecting" step (b), the
district court explained that this limitation was not a step-plus-function limitation
because "[t]he 'selecting' step, as defined by the court, is a sufficiently discrete action
176
in the claimed method."
With respect to the "determining step," the district court stated:
The claim element uses extremely broad language. A simple question
arises: If the step of "determining a condition of the heart" is not limited by
the disclosures, how is it limited at all? CPI asserts in its brief: "The step of
'determining a condition of the heart' carries no limitations in the claim
language as to the manner or way in which the condition is detected, and
none can be properly read into the claim language." P1. Br. at 22. However,
allowing CPI to claim all possible methods of detecting heart arrhythmia
sweeps too broadly. The court is mindful that not all claims using gerunds
should be construed as functions. Nonetheless, comparing the "determining
step" at issue here to the claim elements that avoided § 112 6 in O.L Corp.
v. Tekmar Co. and Serrano v. Telular Corp., the court finds that CPI needed
to remove at least one level of abstraction from its claim. For example, if
the step were phrased in terms of "determining a condition of the heart by
analyzing the output signals generated by heart status detection circuitry to
distinguish among various conditions of the heart," the element would come
much closer to stating how the function of determining a condition of the
heart is performed. Although patentees may wish to state claims as broadly
as possible, they run the danger of reaching the boundaries established by
177
§ 112 6. "Determining a condition of the heart" crosses the line.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit "conclude[d] that the district court erred in
applying § 112 6" to the "determining" step. 178 In doing so, the Federal Circuit
rejected the district court's rationale that the broad language of the claimed step
173 U.S.

Patent No. 4,407,288 col. 21 (filed Mar. 16, 1981) (emphasis added); Cardiac

Pacemakers, 381 F.3d at 1375.

C(rdiac Pacemakers, 2001 WL 912767, at *8.
Pacemakers, Inc. v. Saint Jude Med., Inc., No. IP96-1718-C-H/G, 2000 WL 1765358,
at *24, *34 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 29, 2000), affdinpart,rev'dinpa-rt on other grounds, 381 F.3d 1371.
176 Cardiac Pacemakers, 2001 WL 912767, at *8.
177 CardiacPacemakers, 2000 WL 1765358, at *34.
178 CardiaePacemakers, 381 F.3d at 1382.
174

175 Cardiac
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justified the invocation of § 112,
6.179 On appeal the patentee maintained that
"clause (a) simply recites a step that is part of the claimed method. 8 0 The court
agreed and stated "that 'claiming a step by itself, or even a series of steps, does not
implicate § 112 6,' as explained in 0.1 Corp. v. Tekmar Co." 18 1 The Federal Circuit
then remanded the case to the district court to construe this limitation outside the
confines of§ 112, 6.182 The Federal Circuit also noted:
Method claims necessarily recite the steps of the method, and the preamble
words that "the method comprises the steps of' do not automatically convert
each ensuing step into the form of § 112 6. Nor does the preamble usage
"steps of' create a presumption that each ensuing step is in step-plusfunction form; to the contrary, the absence of the signal "step for" creates
the contrary presumption. 183

VI. Is THERE ANYTHING THAT A CLAIM DRAFTER CAN Do
To AVOID STEP-PLUS-FUNCTION?

The ability of claim drafters to cleanly avoid having § 112, 6 apply to the steps
of method claims will depend on whether the analytical approach suggested by Judge
Rader in his Seal-Flex concurring opinion continues to gain ground or whether the
Federal Circuit directly or indirectly continues to use other ways to avoid § 112, 6.
Either way, here are some suggestions for avoiding § 112, 6.
1. Do not use the phrase "step for." Without doubt, this is the most important
factor. By avoiding "step for," method claim limitations are at least presumed not to
invoke § 112,
6.184 Under at least some Federal Circuit decisions, perhaps this
factor will be definitive.
2. Consider calling limitations "acts" instead of "steps." For example, instead of
reciting "comprising the steps of' in the preamble recite "comprising the acts of."
Under some approaches, a court may attempt to determine whether a recited gerund
is an act or a function.1 8 5 The Federal Circuit has recognized that distinguishing an
act from a function can be very difficult.1 8 6 In reality, it may just be a question of
semantics. Referring to gerunds in method claims as "acts" may allow a court to
more easily find them to be acts. The limitations should also be referred to as acts in
the specification.
Additionally, in O.L Corp. and other decisions, the Federal Circuit has indicated
that use of § 112,
6 is a permissive option which a claim drafter may choose to
invoke or not.187 Using the word "acts" instead of "steps" may also help avoid
179

Id.at 1381.

180Id.
181 Id,
182Id.at

1382.

183 Id.
184 Masco

Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track and Court Constr., 172 F.3d 836, 848-49 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(Rader, J., concurring).
185

186 Id.
187

0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1997):
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invocation of § 112, 6 by making it clear to the public and the courts that the claim
drafter has clearly elected not to invoke § 112, T 6.
3. Avoid using the word "function." As explained above, a court may be asked to
decide whether a gerund is an act or function.188 Referring to the step in the patent
as a function could be used to find that the step recites a function instead of an act.
4. Avoid reciting the function of a step in the claim. The language of the statute
indicates that it may be invoked when a step and a specified function is recited in a
claim limitation. By merely reciting a list of steps without corresponding functions,
§ 112, 6 may be avoided.18 9 In Utica Enterprises, the court even stated that one
step which did not recite a function was even farther removed from § 112, 6 than
another similar step which did recite an associated function. 190
While Judge Rader's concurring position suggests that a court may still identify
a function of a step when the limitation does not recite one by engaging in a careful
study of the various claim limitations, the claim as a whole, and the specification,
such an approach appears to be contrary to the language of the statute and the
treatment given to means-plus-function limitations.191 In this regard, the Federal
Circuit has emphasized that when construing a means-plus-function limitation, a
court does not have leeway in selecting the corresponding function, but rather is
constrained to use only the actual function recited in the claim limitation. 192 For
example, in GenerationII Orthotics, the Federal Circuit remarked "[a]s we stated in
Micro Chem, '[§ 112,
6] does not permit limitation of a means-plus-function claim
by adopting a function different from that explicitly recited in the claim."'a193 In the
context of method claims, if a step is recited without reciting a corresponding
function and the statute permits only use of the specified function, the statute should
then not apply to the limitation. Certainly, given that a court is not free to assign a
function different from a recited function for a means-plus-function limitation, it
should not be free to divine the identity of a function of a step when none has been
recited in the claim.
5. Recite both a function and an act for a step. As an alternative to avoiding
reciting a function, this option entails carefully and clearly reciting an associated
function for a step while also clearly reciting an associated act. Under Judge Rader's
test, § 112, 6 is invoked only for a step which performs a function without the
recital of an act for performing the function. 194 By clearly identifying an act and a
function associated with each step, § 112, 6 would be avoided.

The statute thus in effect provides that an element in a combination method
or process claim may be recited as a step for performing a specified function
without the recital of acts in support of the function. Being drafted with the
permissive "may," the statute does not require that steps in a method claim be
drafted in step-plus-function form but rather allows for that form.
Id. See also Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
188 Seal-Flex, 172 F.3d at 848-49.
189 See CardiacPacemakers, 381 F.3d at 1382; 0.1. Corp., 115 F.3d at 1583.
190 Utica Enters., Inc. v. Fed. Broach & Mach. Co., 109 F. App'x 403, 410 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
191 Seal-Flex, 172 F.3d at 849-50.
192 Generation II Orthotics v. Med. Techs., Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
193 Id. (quoting Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
1999)).
194

Seal-Flex, 172 F.3d at 849.
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Of course, this approach has the downside of requiring the claim drafter to
clutter up a claimed step with additional phrases. These additional phrases may
then serve either intentionally or unintentionally to further limit the scope of the
recited step. Where the prior art affords a broad recital of a step, it would generally
be undesirable to unnecessarily limit the scope of the claim in an effort to avoid the
risk of unintentionally being found to have invoked § 112, 6. There is also the risk
that a court may not construe the recited step, function, and act as intended by the
drafter but instead that find no act is present, rather, only additional functions.
Under such a scenario, the claimed step is hit with a double whammy by invoking
§ 112, 6 for multiple terms, and thus, likely further narrowing its scope.

CONCLUSION

The latest decision by the Federal Circuit in Cardiac Pacemakers joined by
Judge Rader himself may prove very helpful in restoring greater certainty to
patentees and the public and ease the burden on courts. Read in conjunction with
the language of the statute which requires the limitation to recite a step and a
"specified function" and the corresponding implications from the Utica Enterprises
decision, the Cardiac Pacemaker decision may help courts to step away from the
complicated analysis of the Seal-Flex concurring opinion. Using the test proposed by
Judge Rader in Seal-Flex, courts may have to confront the "difficulty of
distinguishing acts from functions" and engage in a "careful analysis of the limitation
in the context of the overall claim and the specification" 195 in an effort to discern an
unexpressed function for a step recited without a function. 196
However, under the recent CardiacPacemakers decision, courts may be allowed
to recognize § 112,
6 does not apply where the patentee has chosen to recite a
method comprising a series of steps, without using the "step for" transition and
without reciting functions associated with each step. 197 In this regard, it should be
noted that in four of the six Federal Circuit decisions that substantively addressed
whether a method claim limitation invoked § 112, 6, namely, the 0.1 Corp., Epcon
Gas, Utica Enterprises, and Cardiac Pacemakers decisions, the Federal Circuit did
not engage in an analysis to determine whether an initial gerund in a limitation was
a function or an act. Rather, these cases can be understood to treat the initial gerund
of a limitation simply as a step. When a method limitation does not contain
additionallanguage which is alleged to be the corresponding function of the initial
gerund, the analysis is over-§ 112, 6 does not apply. Use of such an approach will
greatly simplify step-plus-function analysis, allowing the courts, the parties, and the
public to readily conclude that § 112, 6 does not apply to the great many method
claims which merely recite a series of steps without the additional recital of functions
195 Id. at 849-50.
at 850 ("If the language of the claim element does not expressly state its function, the
function of that element may nonetheless be discernible from the context of the overall claim and the
disclosure in the specification.").
197 Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. Saint Jude Med., Inc., 381 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("C]laiming a step by itself, or even a series of steps, does not implicate § 112
6") (quoting 0.I.
Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
190 Id.
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for each of those steps. For such claims, the semantic and questionable inquiry into
whether a gerund is an act or a function can thus be entirely avoided.

